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Introduction 
In his Écrits as well as in his Seminars, Jacques Lacan refers to 
twentieth-century research fields such as ethology and linguistics to 
elucidate the specificity of a psychoanalytic diagnostics of the human 
condition. While ethology and Gestalt psychology enable him to explain 
how animals dwell in an imaginary world (where particular stimuli – e.g.  the 
images of potential predators, partners or preys – incite particular behavioural 
responses), Saussurean linguistics allows him to analyse how human beings 
exist in the symbolic order (as a typographic ambiance). Against this 
backdrop, Lacan was especially intrigued by the experimental work of Ivan 
Pavlov (1849-1936), a contemporary of Freud and a key precursor of 
twentieth-century psychology (notably behaviourism and the concept of 
social engineering). On various occasions (both in his Seminars and in 
Écrits), Lacan commented on Pavlov’s key discovery (the conditioned 
reflex) which, as Lacan phrases it, can be regarded as the instalment of a 
signifier and as the creation of a rudimentary symbolic ambiance. 
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In animal laboratories, experimenters use research animals (model 
organisms, removed from their natural habitats) as laboratory gadgets and  as 
targets of manipulation, often focussing on specific  partial  objects  within 
the organism. According to Lacan, Pavlov’s laboratory was a symbolic 
environment (1957-1958/1998: 340). All items were carefully selected, all 
activities were standardised (via experimental protocols) and  all events were 
meticulously recorded. Signals acted as signifiers to which animals learned 
to respond by producing certain quantities  of  bodily fluids, notably saliva or 
gastric excretions (1957-1958/1998: 339). In Pavlov’s case, however, 
laboratory dogs allegedly played an active role, up to the point of 
becoming ‘partners’ whose contributions were acknowledged in 
academic publications.1 
 
On closer inspection, however, a more suspicious analysis suggests 
that these oral and gastric substances were actually produced by the 
experimenters themselves, using the animals as mere machines, as living 
reactor vessels (Lacan 1964/1973: 254-255). The perceptivity of research 
animals was tested and trained, but a genuine dialogue never came about 
(Lacan 1957-1958: 340). Although these dogs actively (or even eagerly) 
participated in the research, they never became equals. And although the 
laboratory setting functioned as a scaffold for  establishing certain signals as 
signifiers, their meaning was limited to the interaction between the 
researchers and their dogs, so that the latter never really learned  a  language. 
In short, the access of Pavlov’s dogs to the scientific laboratory  as a 
symbolic ambiance was limited. 
 
 
1 In publications, Pavlov formally thanked his dogs for their assistance: ‘[T]his method 
was adopted as a result of a hint given by one of the dogs subjected to the operation. We 
gratefully acknowledge that by its manifestation of common sense the dog has helped us as 
well as itself’ (1955: 89/90); For Pavlov, the dog was ‘almost a participant in the experiments 
conducted upon it, greatly facilitating the success of the research by its understanding and 
compliance’ (Todes 2002: 52). 
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Ideally, animal laboratories are perfectly organised settings which 
satisfy all animal needs, thereby reflecting a modernistic, utopian ideal 
(Lacan 1957-1958/1998: 461), a brave new world, perfectly managed with 
the help of science and technology (1957-1958/1998: 463). This explains 
why the communist leadership (notably Lenin and Trotsky) were firmly 
supportive of Pavlov’s work: they saw his laboratory as a window into the 
future and as a model version of a future communist society. In reality, 
however, Pavlov’s laboratory was not that animal-friendly at  all. It produced 
animal suffering in various forms (as  unintended by-product of the 
research), resulting in various kind of symptoms. Pavlov even noticed 
‘experimental neurosis’ among his dogs (Lacan 1966: 273; 1962-
1963/2004: 72). His lab was a pathogenic environment, a totalitarian regime 
that cared for its animals but exploited their bodies as production factors, 
while eventually it was the scientific Master  who  enjoyed  the  fruits of the 
dogs’ labour, in the form of publishable knowledge. The laboratory was a 
knowledge factory driven by  desire, by  a  will to know,  but also by a will to 
power, a desire to acquire behavioural control (1964/1973: 264; cf. Zwart 
2014). 
 
In this paper, I will subject Lacan’s comments on Pavlov’s experiments 
to a close rereading in order to explore how Lacanian psychoanalysis allows 
us to assess the dynamics of Pavlov’s research practice (as an epistemic case 
history). At the same time, precisely because Pavlov’s experiments can be 
regarded as the enactment of the coming into being of the signifier, a mutual 
exposure of psychoanalysis and classical conditioning may help us to 
elucidate some of Lacan’s basic concepts. For indeed, Pavlov’s research 
facilities replicate the Urszene  (the  primal  scene) of the symbolic order (in 
the beginning was the signifier, as an intrusion into the metabolic cycle of 
needs). 
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The design of my article is as follows. First, I will point  to  the  crucial 
role of animal research in the development of two core Lacanian concepts, 
namely the imaginary and the symbolic. Subsequently, I will assess Pavlov’s 
research practice from a  Lacanian  perspective,  as  a specific instantiation of 
what Lacan (1969-1970/1991) refers to as university discourse: 
 
 
S2 (knowledge produced by 
experimental researchers as agents) 
a (the allusive, questionable 
target of research) 
S1 (the disavowed truth: Pavlov’s 
laboratory as exemplification of the ideology 
of social engineering) 
$ (animal suffering as by- 
product; experimental research as an 
impossible profession) 
 
 
 
My Lacanian assessment of classical conditioning will focus 
respectively on: (a) the process of knowledge production through 
experimental technoscience (S2 in the upper-left position, the researcher as 
agent); (b) classical (Pavlovian) conditioning as a paradigmatic 
exemplification of a communist ideology (social engineering as Pavlov’s 
philosopheme or guiding idea: S1 in the lower-left position,  as  the disavowed 
truth of Pavlov’s research); (c) the role of saliva  and  gastric juice as objects 
of scientific desire (the object a in  the  upper-right  position); and finally (d) 
the issue of physical and psychic suffering of animals as ‘victims of science’ 
(Ryder 1975), notably in the form of experimental neurosis, and its 
consequences for experimental research as  an ‘impossible’ profession ($ in 
the lower-right position, as unintended by- product). 
 
Preliminary analysis: Lacan and animal research 
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Lacan’s oeuvre is dedicated to an objective which, at first glance,    may 
seem rather paradoxical, namely the objective to return to Freud, not only by 
carefully rereading him, but also by radically rephrasing his work, in 
dialogue with the evolving vocabularies of twentieth-century science, 
including experimental ethology and modern linguistics. This objective (this 
therapeutic intervention) was based on a critical diagnostics of post- war 
psychoanalytical discourse. According to Lacan (1966: 244), 
psychoanalytical discourse had deteriorated because Freud’s oeuvre  had been 
ignored, forgotten and obliterated. Moreover, as the psychoanalytic 
community went into exile and migrated (notably to the United States), 
psychoanalytic discourse had become susceptible to the logic  and mentality 
of behaviourism (Lacan 1966: 245), a form of human engineering (ibid.: 
246) aimed at facilitating adaptation of individuals to a challenging and 
competitive social environment. To segregate psychoanalytic discourse 
from human engineering and behaviourism again (more generally: from the 
discourse of the human  sciences),  Lacan proposed to return to Freud by 
rereading him in a  careful,  verbatim  manner. Not, however, in the sense 
that Freud should function as a Master, an authoritative voice, a guarantee of 
truth (S1), unleashing a servile and apologetic form of discourse, which 
Lacan would later refer to as the discourse of the Master (Lacan 1969-
1970/1991). In such as  discourse, Freud experts (S2) function as privileged 
recipients or authorised  custodians of an unquestionable dogma. Rather,  
Lacan aimed to  recover  the unique dynamics of psychoanalytic discourse as 
a discourse sui generis (later reframed as the ‘discourse of the analyst’), 
revolving around the discovery of unconscious desire (the Freudian truth 
event). Psychoanalysis  is neither as Master’s discourse, Lacan argues, nor a 
particular branch of ‘university discourse’. Although psychoanalysis is bent 
on elucidating the experiences and utterances of human subjects, Lacan 
emphasises that it is not a human science, for he sees the latter as intimately 
connected with 
Hub Zwart 
Vestigia vol.1(2) summer 2018 63 
 
 
 
 
psychological engineering, technocracy and human resource management 
(1966: 859). 
 
Paradoxically, however, while proposing this return to Freud, Lacan  at 
the same time contends that Freud himself was not really able to specify the 
uniqueness of his intellectual endeavour, notably because  of  his reliance on 
nineteenth-century science as his frame of reference (in other words: his lack 
of familiarity with post-1900 scientific developments). Freud was acquainted 
with Darwinism and Victorian anthropology (which he incorporated in 
Totem and Taboo for instance), but much less familiar with scientific 
movements such as Saussurean linguistics or Gestalt psychology, whose 
histories coincide more or less with the history of psychoanalysis. In order  to  
elucidate the singular  epistemological profile of psychoanalysis as 
inaugurated by Freud, Lacan explicitly  draws  on  these twentieth-century 
research fields: first of all on linguistics and ethology, but also on later 
developments such as cybernetics, molecular biology and computer science. 
Linguistics and ethology were especially important for Lacan because they 
allowed him to elucidate the two basic registers or dimensions of human 
experience as revealed by psychoanalysis, namely the imaginary and the 
symbolic (as two different strategies for addressing the real). 
 
Modern linguistics, Lacan argued, studies  the symbolic  order, notably 
the role and primacy of the signifier, functioning in networks of signifiers, 
and opening up a new dimension of experience, accessible via language and 
thereby broadening our temporal and spatial horizon. Language allows us to 
speak about (and to fear or desire) things we cannot see or hear,  things 
which may have existed in the past, or may come to  exist in the future, 
things which are ungraspable (in the literal sense of the term), and this 
includes technoscientific entities such as genes, neutrinos, 
Hub Zwart 
Vestigia vol.1(2) summer 2018 64 
 
 
 
 
Higgs bosons and synthetic cells. They primarily function as signifiers, i.e. 
as elements in networks of concepts, visible on PowerPoints or computer 
screens perhaps, but the actual connection with visible  and tangible entities 
(between words and things) remains questionable. 
 
In a similar manner, Lacan argues, modern ethology allows us to 
elucidate the imaginary dimension of experience. According to Lacan, 
animals inhabit an imaginary world. They respond to certain visual forms (as 
described by Gestalt psychology) for instance, which  function  as  stimuli 
triggering certain responses (as part of the animal’s behavioural repertoire). 
To some extent, human experience remains susceptible to the imaginary as 
well. The image (gestalt) of a dangerous carnivore (Jaws), or   a monstrous 
dinosaur (Jurassic Park), or a human-like hybrid (Frankenstein), or the 
enlarged image of a praying mantis (providing a detailed impression of the 
insect’s inexorable jaws and eyes, Lacan 1961-1962, p. 120) may invoke in 
us a sense of fear, triggering certain physiological reactions, such as a fight, 
flight or freeze response, measureable and quantifiable with the help of 
precision instruments, in the context of psychological experiments for 
instance. Likewise, young, cuddly, furry animals may invoke in us an  
emotional-behavioural repertoire of sympathy and caring. Yet, Lacan argues 
that, also in their dealings with animals, humans predominantly dwell in a 
symbolic world, and our relations with animals are first and foremost 
structured in a  symbolic manner. 
 
Take for example heraldic symbols used by medieval knights on shields 
or coats of arms (Lacan 1956-1957/1994). These lions or eagles   did not 
serve to frighten or deter opponents. Rather, they functioned as symbols 
expressing allegiance to a particular house or clan, allowing the knights 
involved to distinguish friend from foe, even in the heat of battle. 
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The cover of Lacan’s first Seminar  (Lacan  1953-1954/1975)  bears the 
image of a large elephant with impressive white tusks, although elephants 
are mentioned only in passing. Again, although it is evident that the image of 
a large elephant may evoke in us a sense of admiration, fear    or terror, and 
may therefore perhaps give rise to a fight, flight or freeze response 
(depending on the circumstances), modern humans primarily interact with 
such animals in a symbolic manner. Our understanding of animals such as 
elephants is infected by language as it were, by  language  in general, but 
notably by the language games of modern science (Zwart 2014). Science 
classifies these animals (labelling them as  ‘pachyderms’, for instance), but 
also monitors and keeps count of them, and may even list them as 
endangered species. The fact that humans at a certain point coined the word 
elephant, Lacan argues, is the single most important event in this animal’s 
entire history. It is because we have the signifier ‘elephant’ at our disposal (as 
an element in scientific and political networks  of  signifiers) that we are able 
to deliberate about its future, make decisions and design policies that 
determine the elephant’s future fate. According to Lacan, animals themselves 
do not enter deliberations of this kind. They dwell in a different, imaginary 
world, dominated by images (functioning as stimuli triggering responses). 
Our relationships with animals are mediated  in  a very fundamental way by 
taxonomies, regulations, quantifiable indicators and the like. They are 
grounded in the symbolic order: the world of names and numbers, laws and 
treatises, stock taking and population counts. Against this backdrop, Lacan 
developed a special interest in Pavlov’s research practice (classical 
conditioning). 
 
Classical conditioning and the production of knowledge (S2) 
Ivan Pavlov (1849-1937) was a contemporary of  Freud. Like Freud, 
he received his training from representatives of the famous German school 
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of physiology (Ernst Brücke in the case of Freud, Carl Ludwig in the case  of 
Pavlov). After returning to St. Petersburg, Pavlov became professor of 
physiology at the Medical Academy and director of the physiological 
department of the Institute of Experimental Science. His early work with 
dogs dealt with digestion. For his book Lectures on the work of  the  digestive 
Glands (published in 1897), he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1904. Various 
authors point to analogies between Pavlov’s experimental work about 
excitation and inhibition and Freud’s views on repression and adjustment 
(Windholz 1990). In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious 
(1905/1940: 225), Freud himself mentions Pavlov in the context of mistaken 
expectations, suggesting that Pavlov’s dogs, producing saliva in response to 
the food they expect to receive, are victims of deception. Notwithstanding 
these correspondences, however, Lacan himself emphasises the difference 
between the two, also to elucidate the extent to which psychoanalysis (as an 
endeavour sui generis) differs from contemporary psychology, notably 
behaviourism and other  forms  of ‘human science’. The latter, Lacan argues, 
are focussed on the rational management of human resources, rather than on 
self-knowledge and working-through. 
 
Pavlov’s oeuvre concurs with what Lacan (1969-1970/1991) refers to as 
university discourse, which can best be explained by comparing it to the 
Master’s discourse: 
 
 
S1 (authoritative voice as agent) S2 (expert recipients as 
custodians) 
$ (suppressed questionability) a (intellectual jouissance as by- 
product) 
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The discourse of the Master builds on an authoritative voice,  a  guiding 
source (S1), such as the book of Genesis for instance, which functions as 
starting point for the production of scholarly knowledge concerning nature. 
Scholarly experts (S2) act as qualified recipients, and their discourse 
typically consists of apologetic glosses and comments. Uncertainties or 
doubts, which must have tormented the anonymous  authors of these 
authoritative sources in real life, are disavowed ($ pushed beneath the bar). 
Although it is a servile type of discourse, it offers intellectual jouissance to 
the scholars involved, for instance because it allows them to recognise the 
fingerprints of God in various marvels of creation (in particular insects or 
flowers for instance). Such marvels are singled out as objects (a) of 
intellectual desire, of the experts’ cupido sciendi, the scholarly will to know. 
 
University discourse is the result of a scientific revolution: an anti- 
clockwise quarter-turn of the quadruped scheme. The  academic  experts (S2) 
have emancipated, so that they themselves now occupy  the  (upper- left) 
position of the agent, addressing, questioning  and exploiting particular 
objects (upper-right position), allegedly in a disinterested and objective 
manner. The authoritative source providing guidance (S1) is pushed into the 
lower-left position (below the bar). Qualified experts (S2) rely on technical, 
experimental skills rather than on ideological guidance, and interact with 
their research targets via technological contrivances (laboratory props and 
experimental techniques). 
 
On closer inspection, however, things prove much more complicated, 
as indicated by Lacan’s quadruped scheme. On  the left-side of  the scheme, a 
disavowed ideological truth may still be at work, for instance: the desire  to 
promote a modern scientific (say: Darwinian) worldview (at the expense of 
creationism), or the desire to promote social engineering as a utopian 
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ideal. On the right-side of the scheme, the target of research (a) is not the 
natural, living organism as such, but something more partial, specific and 
elusive, something ‘else’ to which the research animal at hand is expected  to 
provide access. Yet, the target of research may prove  a  rather intractable, 
allusive object: an obstacle rather than an opening, a source of frustration 
even, to such an extent that scientific researchers become tormented subjects 
($), unable to live up to academic requirements and expectations. Their 
object of research becomes an obsession, trapping the researchers involved, 
draining their energy and wasting their lives. Eventually, not only the 
research animals (sacrificed to the progress of experimental knowledge 
production), but also the researchers themselves may become ‘victims of 
science’ ($ as unintended by-product in the lower- right position): 
S2 (the qualified, experimental 
researcher) 
a (elusive target of the knowledge 
process) 
S1 (the disavowed ideological 
truth) 
$ (animal suffering and tormented 
subjects, researchers as victims of 
science) 
 
 
 
This quadruped scheme also applies to  Pavlov’s  paradigmatic research 
with animals as conducted in his laboratory (in St. Petersburg / Leningrad). 
The experimental researchers (equipped with laboratory technologies) act as 
agents: as initiators of the discourse  and as producers of scientific 
knowledge (S2). Their objective is to  manipulate the  object: the research 
animal, or rather: a specific ‘partial object’ (a), using specific organs of 
animals (stomachs, salivary glands, etc.) to produce certain substances which 
can subsequently be measured and transformed into quantitative data, 
publishable in journals and citable by others (as the surplus value of the 
products produced by experimental organisms). 
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Pavlov’s research was initially focussed on metabolism. The independent 
variable was a certain amount of food (e.g. meat on a plate), while the 
dependent variable was the research animal’s response, e.g.  the  secretion of 
body fluids, notably saliva or gastric juice, in response to the food presented. 
Pavlov made small openings (windows of fistulas) in the throat  or stomachs 
of his  animals to collects these secretions, so as to measure  and analyse the 
samples (the object a) as carefully as  possible.  Thus,  saliva and gastric 
juice (slimy substances, which may be regarded as detestable in normal life) 
became highly valuable entities, representing the “animal other”, but 
condensed into an unpalatable sample of fluid (the object a of Pavlov’s 
research: Lacan 1972-1973/1975: 183). Psychoanalytically speaking, 
this focus on gastric juice or drops of  drool (as symptoms of conditioning) 
added a perverse twist  to  Pavlovian research, reflecting the perverse 
jouissance so often involved in scientific experiments. For indeed, science 
quite often displays a remarkable interest in substances such as saliva, urine, 
stool, cervical smear or cheek swap samples, produced by erogenous orifices 
(mouth, penis, vagina, anus) and serving as windows into the condition of 
the organism as a whole. 
 
In the context of his experimental work, however, Pavlov discovered 
(around the year 1900) that his dogs not only responded to  the sight  or smell 
of meat, but also to certain signals associated with it, such as the opening of 
a door or the sound of a bell. Thus, in the context of a physiological research 
program formally devoted to studying mammal metabolism, he unexpectedly 
made his most famous discovery: the conditioned reflex as an elementary 
building-block of twentieth-century psychology, notably behaviourism and 
learning theory. Because of this discovery, he decided to shift the focus of his 
research from (nineteenth- century) animal physiology to (twentieth-century) 
animal psychology. Pavlov’s version of the university discourse can be 
represented as follows: 
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S2 (knowledge produced by 
experimental experts) 
a (bodily secretions as 
substances of value) 
S1 (the political ideological truth) $ (frustrations: the divided 
subject) 
 
 
 
S2 is (the discourse of) the experimental expert, producing reliable 
(quantified, replicable) knowledge via an experimental design, allowing 
researchers to quantify and manipulate animal behaviour. S2 functions as  the 
agent: the initiator of the knowledge production process. The research animal 
acts as the ‘other’, the recipient to which the researchers’ questions are 
addressed and whose products (produced in response: e.g. saliva and gastric 
juice) are appropriated by the experimenter. Interestingly, however, in the 
case of Pavlov, the research animal is  almost treated as  a  partner.  His dogs 
are described as cooperative animals, as partners in the research, as almost-
human research subjects and as members almost of the team (Todes 2002: 
52), – the researcher’s best friend.2 In publications, Pavlov expressed his 
gratitude to his dogs, formally thanking them for their assistance.3 
 
On closer inspection, however, Pavlov is not interested in these 
friendly participants at all. Ultimately, his cupido sciendi  (his  will  to  know) 
is focussed on something very specific, something which is completely 
independent of the animal’s willingness or gusto to participate, namely a 
certain type of bodily fluid, produced by certain organs, in 
 
 
2 Pavlov’s favourite dog, whose cooperative behaviour ‘contributed’ greatly to the 
writing of his Lectures, was called Druzhok (‘Little Friend’). 
 
3 Pavlov emphasizes that “physiology in general owes much to the intelligence of the 
dog” (1955: 104). 
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response to certain signals manipulated by the researchers, and collected 
and appropriated by the laboratory system. 
 
This already suggests that, in order to really understand what is 
happening between researcher and animal above the bar, we must also pay 
attention to what is happening beneath the bar. First of all, although the 
research is presented as ‘disinterested’ and ‘purely scientific’, one of the 
reasons for Lacan’s interest in Pavlov’s work is that it reflects the  philosophy 
and zeitgeist of a particular political ideology (an ideological universe even), 
namely communism as a twentieth-century creed (S1 in the lower-left 
position). The conditioned reflex provides a powerful tool for social 
engineering. Sooner or later, research animals will be replaced by humans, 
and scientists will become the social engineers of the human psyche. 
Pavlovian psychology (and for Lacan, this applies to the human sciences as 
such) is a style of research driven by interest. It is interested in developing 
effective, evidence-based tools for manipulation and exploitation. 
Ideally, society as a whole becomes structured as Pavlov’s laboratory (i.e. 
Pavlov’s laboratory as a small-scale, anticipatory model of an ideal state, a 
window into the communist future). 
 
Pavlov’s research as window into a brave new future (the 
philosopheme of social engineering, S1) 
The concept of the conditioned reflex (coined by Pavlov in 1901) is 
symptomatic for the transition from nineteenth-century science to 
twentieth-century science. Before 1900, Pavlov contributed to the research 
paradigm of the German physiological school, represented by Brücke, 
Ludwig and others. By introducing the conditioned  reflex,  however, Pavlov 
inaugurated a new style of research, destined to evolve into behaviourism 
and learning theory. This transition reflected a transvaluation of 
values, replacing the nineteenth-century desire to 
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understand living beings by the twentieth-century desire to manipulate 
living organisms, in accordance with Jacques Loeb’s claim (pronounced 
around 1900) that biology should become biotechnology, bent on optimising 
rather than on understanding nature (Pauly 1987). 
 
Pavlov personified the emergence of a research field based on 
disciplined, manual labour and destined to replace a more spiritual and 
artistic view on human existence. In  other words, he  personified the type  of 
research advocated in an anticipatory manner by Bazarov in Turgenev’s 
famous novel Fathers and Sons (1861/1965; Todes 2014: 32; Zwart 2008: 
99). Turgenev’s classic novel analyses the generation conflict between 
artistic, romantic fathers (dedicated to art and novel-reading) and their 
technoscientific sons (bent on exploring and reengineering nature, notably 
with the help of animal experiments). The claim that research should aim   to 
control and manipulate the object (the living organism) is the basic 
conviction of this type of research: its guiding philosopheme (S1 in the lower-
left position), in combination with the relentless imperative of the new 
scientific knowledge-power regime, namely to produce more knowledge: 
never enough! (1969-1970/1991: 120-121). Pavlov’s research can be 
regarded as the technical realisation of something which, in the 1860s, was 
still a utopian (or dystopian) literary dream. Pavlov’s experimental method is 
developed in a laboratory context, but may subsequently be extrapolated into 
society as such, in the form of social engineering, so that political utopianism 
gives way to science, as Friedrich Engels once phrased it (Engels 1880). The 
laboratory becomes an outpost gazing into the future, a theatre where 
segments of this future can be systematically probed and tested (Zwart 
2009). What works with dogs may later be tried on humans. A visitor of 
Pavlov’s facility may well have felt like the American journalist Joseph 
Lincoln Steffens who, after visiting the 
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Soviet Union (during the heydays of technoscientific utopia), claimed: “I have 
seen the future and it works” (Kaplan 1974). 
 
This explains why the communist regime was very supportive of 
Pavlov’s research and why Lacan sees Pavlov’s work as symptomatic for 
soviet communism as such. After speaking with Pavlov, Lenin proclaimed 
his desire to re-educate the Russian people as an animal trainer  would (Figes 
1996). In October 1919, Lenin allegedly paid a secret visit to Pavlov’s 
laboratory to find out how the work on conditional reflexes might help 
communism to control human behaviour. The ultimate aim of communism 
was to improve human beings and to transform human nature. Although 
Pavlov was critical of communism, he was patronized by the Bolshevik 
regime. Lenin spoke of Pavlov’s work as hugely significant for the revolution 
and Trotsky saw the production a new, improved version of humankind as the 
great task of Communism, using  current humanity  as  raw material, or as a  
semi-manufactured product. In  1923, Trotsky  wrote  to Pavlov arguing that, 
whereas Freudians assumed an artistic stance towards human existence, 
Pavlov opted for an experimental, physiological approach (Windholz 1990), 
so that his reflex doctrine might provide a physiological substructure to 
Freudian theories (Todes 2014: 500). Despite its literary tendencies, he 
argued, psychoanalysis could be encompassed as  a special case of doctrine 
of conditioned reflexes (Roudinesco 1986: 50). Later, however, Pavlovian 
psychology became the official doctrine and in 1949 it was formally declared 
that Pavlov had demolished ‘the Freudian house of cards’ (Roudinesco 1986: 
53). On January 24, 1921, a formal Decree was published on Pavlov’s 
research (Lenin 1921/1965: 69), indicating that, in view of Pavlov’s 
outstanding scientific services, which were of tremendous importance to the 
working people of the world, a special committee was established to 
guarantee the best conditions for research. While ‘the academician Pavlov’s 
laboratory’ would be furnished 
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with every possible facility, Pavlov and his wife would receive a special food 
ration, equal in caloricity to two normal academic rations. Ironically, Pavlov 
himself was regarded as a kind of experimental dog by the communist 
authorities, encouraged to continue to produce his products by installing a 
specific signifier (the formally signed decree) signifying the advent of more 
food (during a period of massive deprivation and  starvation). A specific form 
of scientific work is singled out as being of strategic importance. 
 
According to Lacan, the aim of communism was  to  reorganise society 
on a rational basis, transforming it into a large-scale laboratory for social 
engineering. The Soviet Union, Lacan argued, was a society which was 
completely under the sway of university discourse4: a society ideally 
designed by political engineers and devoted to  producing  strategic products. 
He saw the Soviet Union as decidedly science-based, relying on physics, 
dialectical materialism and social engineering (Zwart 2017a: 34). A similar 
wave of social engineering and human resources management could be 
discerned in capitalism as well, however, notably in the form of Taylorism, 
Fordism and other instances of Americanism. While Pavlovian knowledge 
(S2) could provide scientific input for communism, Pavlov’s work could be 
regarded as the realisation or condensation of an ideology   of social 
engineering, of an ideological philosopheme (S1), reaching out to Pavlov’s 
activities from beneath the bar as it were. 
 
Let this suffice as an analysis of the relationship between Pavlovian 
knowledge (S2) and the philosopheme of social  engineering (S1).  In  the 
next section, focus will shift to the object pole of the knowledge 
 
 
4 “Ce qui règne dans ce qu’on appelle communément l’Union des républiques 
socialistes soviétiques, c’est l’université” (1969-1970/1991: 237). 
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relationship, because Lacan was interested in Pavlov’s work first and foremost 
because of what happened at the right side of the quadruped. 
 
Salivating Others (bodily secretions as object a) 
For Lacan, the experimental situation constructed by  Pavlov’s research 
practice represented a bridge between the animal and the human world, 
between the imaginary and the symbolic. Pavlov discovered something 
which may seem obvious: something which is known since time immemorial 
from every-day life-world experience, namely that humans communicate 
with dogs (and other domesticated animals) via signals (such as whistles and 
bells). Pavlov verified this experimentally, however, under controlled 
conditions, recognising its importance and turning it into the basic building 
block of a prestigious research program. The fact that dogs may be trained to 
respond to the sound of a whistle is common knowledge, but Pavlov’s 
prestige stems from the fact that, with the help of specific signals and plates 
of meat, he demonstrated exactly how this worked, namely via the 
conditioned reflex as the elementary building block of animal and human 
behaviour. 
 
For Lacan, however, the question is whether, by learning to respond  to 
signals, these research animals really entered the symbolic  order.  In other 
words: whether these signals can be regarded as signifiers, as  symbols, as 
elements of a language. In Écrits (1966: 273), Lacan phrases the question 
somewhat jocularly as follows: if we can teach animals to respond to the 
sight of a printed menu (by producing saliva, for instance), can they also 
learn to consider the various prices that are listed on  the  card? And is the 
gastric juice produced by the dogs comparable to similar visceral reactions of 
humans in response to terms like ‘contract’ or ‘marriage contract’? These 
and similar remarks suggest that, according to Lacan, there is still an 
unsurmountable difference or gap separating the 
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human from the animal world. In the case of humans, Lacan argues, the 
stimulus (the word ‘contract’, used in an experiment which measures 
reaction time, for instance) is a linguistic element functioning in a network of 
signifiers. In Pavlov’s experiments, however, the  sound  of  a  bell remains a 
stand-alone signal, only valid within the interaction between researchers and 
research animals. In Pavlov’s laboratory, the signal actually indicates the 
presence or advent of a human subject (the research associate, conducting the 
experiment). Lacan explicitly mentions Pavlov- style experiments in which 
animals are conditioned to  differentiate  between a circle and an ellipse 
(Lacan 1966: 141). Have these animals acquired mathematical knowledge 
when they begin to salivate as soon as they see circle rather than an ellipse? 
 
In order to further elucidate this difference, Lacan uses the role of 
foreplay in human eroticism. Besides the erogenous  zones  directly involved 
in intercourse, other bodily surfaces may become involved in eroticism as 
well, as targets for various preparatory (seductive) courtship activities, or 
even as substitutes for sexual intercourse, so that lovers may kiss the lips, 
hands, ears, hands, shoulders, forehead, etc.  of  beloved others, thereby 
expressing and triggering erotic desire. Certain gestures (blinking an eye, for 
instance) may work as a signal, but in the case of human eroticism, these 
auxiliary activities may even expand to things like poetry or music as 
aphrodisiacs. As Lacan phrases it, although we may discern the functioning 
of the unconscious in ‘the peristaltic movements of  a Pavlovian dog’, in 
humans it also expresses itself in eloquent and elaborate literary genres, such 
as macaronic poetry, courtly tablature and Gongorismo (Lacan 1966: 467). 
Thus, in the world of human love, a trans- natural, symbolic sphere is opened 
up. Although also in  the  case  of humans conditioned and unconditioned 
reflexes will incite the production of saliva, sperm and vaginal fluids, and 
may even unleash peristaltic 
Hub Zwart 
Vestigia vol.1(2) summer 2018 77 
 
 
 
 
spasms in response to certain aversive stimuli (Lacan 1966: 817)5, Lacan 
maintains that human erotic desire differs from animalistic behavioural 
circuits. When it comes to articulating the difference more precisely, 
however, Pavlov’s experiments are of significant value. 
 
Pavlov’s experiments are focussed on the presence or absence of 
certain quantities of bodily fluids, such as gastric juice and saliva, which, 
under normal circumstances, may be regarded as worthless or even 
detestable. In the context of Pavlov’s research, these substances suddenly 
become highly significant and valuable, to such an extent that countless 
experiments are dedicated to producing them, turning these substances into 
the ‘object a’ of this type of research, but why? What exactly does  a  specific 
quantity of gastric juice or saliva signify? For Lacan, Pavlov’s experiments 
are important because they demonstrate (under controlled laboratory 
conditions) the birth, the implementation of the signifier. They allow us to 
witness how an apparently arbitrary signal (the sound of a bell, the shape of a  
circle, etc.) may acquire a  certain meaning and may convey a certain 
message (‘salivate!’). It  is, as Lacan phrases it, the staging, the  mis en scène 
of the signifier (Lacan 1967-1968: 8). It demonstrates how a formerly 
meaningless signal may suddenly unleash a measurable bodily impact. The 
signifier, once established, announces the  advent or  presence of  a  human 
subject, the experimental researcher (1962-1963/2004: 72). It is a molecule 
of language, as it were. 
 
That a personal bond between researcher and research animal is 
developed (or reinforced) in the course of the experiment is no 
5 “La délimitation même de la ‘zone érogène’ que la pulsion isole du métabolisme de la 
fonction (l’acte de la dévoration intéresse d’autres organes que la bouche, demandez-les au 
chien de Pavlov) est le fait d’une coupure qui trouve faveur du trait anatomique d’une marge 
ou d’une bord: lèvres, ‘enclos des dents’, marge de l’anus, sillon pénien, vagin, fente 
palpébrale, voire cornet de l’oreille… L’érogénéité respiratoire est mal étudiée, mais c’est 
évidemment par le spasme qu’elle entre en jeu” (Lacan 1966: 817) 
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coincidence (1967-1968: 9), for the animal’s love and attachment is 
established via food. As Lacan phrases it, Pavlov was ‘a 
structuralist’ (ibid.: 8; 12), a structuralist avant la lettre and of the strictest 
observance even. He was interested in the functioning of the elementary 
components of the symbolic order, and the conditioned reflex is the 
elementary segment of a symbolic system which operates without any 
reference to something “spiritual”, to things like intentionality, self- 
consciousness a soul, etc. (Lacan 1967-1968: 8). Via conditioning, 
domesticated animals enter our world (our symbolic environment) to some 
extent. The signal can be anything (a sound, a circle, etc.), for the signifier is 
something completely arbitrary. Also, Pavlov’s experiments  confirm what 
Lacan refers to as the primacy of the signifier. Once established, the 
emergence of the signifier suffices to elicit the behaviour in question (in 
response to the signified, i.e. the idea or expectation of food). Even if food is 
not really involved, the signal unleashes the response. 
 
And yet, Pavlov’s experiments also show that the signal is not  really  a 
signifier (Lacan 1964/1973: 254) and that the animal  does  not  really learn a 
language. The signal is only locally valid (within the laboratory context), 
Lacan argues, and functions solely in the relationship between researcher and 
research animal (allowing the researcher to manipulate the latter). Such 
signals do not evolve into a  language  (an  autonomous network of 
signifiers), and they remain rudimentary linguistic components. It is a 
temporary ad hoc  language at best. The conditioned reflex shows that the 
experimental set-up allows us to make a cut (and to introduce a detour) in the 
circuit of bodily needs, but it also shows why an animal will never really 
learn to speak (Lacan 1964/1973: 263). The desire involved in the 
experiment, the desire that is put at risk and questioned, is the desire of the 
researchers themselves (ibid.: 264): it is their will to  know,  their  cupido 
sciendi, focused on (or obsessed even) by the presence or absence 
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of saliva and gastric juice, not because of the use value (nutritional or 
otherwise) of these fluids, but because they demonstrate that behaviour is 
open to manipulation, that social engineering is possible in principle. The 
responses which are registered, somewhere in the animal’s organic system, 
are not an ‘answer’ to a question. Rather, they reflect and mirror the 
activities of the experimenters themselves. The interaction is not really a 
dialogue. The experimenter remains the Big Other in Pavlov’s proto- 
totalitarian micro-state, and research animals can only perceive and respond. 
Their otherness becomes progressively erased. Although the production of 
saliva answers a question, both  the posing  of  the question and the 
interpretation of saliva as an ‘answer’ is done exclusively by the 
experimenters. For Lacan, the Turing test is the ability to lie and deceive, 
and animals (as involuntary producers of gastric juice or drool) are unable  to 
do so, for to lie and deceive requires that language is in place (Lacan 1962-
1963/2004: 78). 
 
In other words, Pavlov’s experiments represent a boundary situation. 
Posing and answering questions (including the ability to lie and deceive,  for 
instance by fabricating research results)  remains  a  privilege  of speaking 
subjects. This also explains why human beings (after a certain  age) will no 
longer be helped by offering them a bottle  with  a  plastic nipple to satisfy 
their oral desire. The conditioned reflex revolves around a basic need, which 
can be satisfied in principle, but when it  comes  to  human desire, humans 
will rather order a particular brand of yoghurt, wine  or whiskey, marked by a 
particular label: a substitute, psychoanalytically speaking, for something 
which is irretrievably lost (the oral object a). 
 
In short, conditioning is the establishment of a signifier: the 
rudimentary beginning of symbolic communication. It introduces a third 
(triadic, symbolical) term into the dual stimulus-response mechanism. 
Hub Zwart 
Vestigia vol.1(2) summer 2018 80 
 
 
 
 
Thus, humans may train and communicate with animals under 
domestication (Lacan 1957-1958/1998: 339) and there is a connection 
between conditioning and detention (i.e. dependence). We do not 
communicate with animals in the wild. The signifier intervenes in the 
metabolic and behavioural cycles of domesticated animals. Sounds and 
signals employed to stimulate trained animals are signifiers, and the 
laboratory is an environment of signifiers, but the signal remains  an  isolated 
third term, only valid in the context of the interaction between researcher and 
research animal. Therefore, this type of communication differs from 
speaking a language. What is missing, as Lacan phrases it, is concatenation 
(ibid.: 340): the linking together of various signifiers into series or networks. 
In Pavlov’s laboratory, signifiers remain arbitrary segments and do not 
follow any rules or laws. There is no symbolic order beyond the Pavlovian 
signifier. For humans (for the experimental researchers) the laboratory as a 
topological ambiance, a typographical space, a cultural environment replete 
with symbols (letters, acronyms, numbers, clocks, exit signs, etc.), but this 
typographical arena only exists for the researchers involved. For the animals, 
only particular elements become meaningful. 
 
Saliva is the object a, the object of desire, but exclusively for the 
researchers. Its absence and presence confirms or undermines a theoretical 
expectation, a hypothesis, something which emerges in a network of 
signifiers. Saliva is something to  be desired, not because of smell or taste  of 
course, but precisely because it can be taken out of circulation (with the help 
of a fistula, a tube, a petri dish). It can be collected, quantified and analysed, 
and eventually sublated into quantified input for equations, publications and 
citations (assuming academic market value). In other words, although 
researchers exist in a physical environment (they need food, oxygen, light, 
etc.), they dwell in a symbolical ambiance as well. 
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And while food is something physical and metabolic, an ‘academic ration’ of 
food (single or double: depending on the Bolshevist authorities) is something 
which belongs to the symbolic order. Conditioning implies that research 
animals enter the symbolic realm, but in a rudimentary way,  namely via a  
limited set  of  signifiers, signifying the presence or  advent of a human other. 
 
Experimental neurosis as unintended by-product ($) 
As a rule, one of the unintended by-products  of  experimental research 
with animals is animal suffering and the moral dilemmas raised    by this 
(Ryder 1975; Dol et al 1999; Zwart 2016). Although on paper Pavlov’s 
research practice is presented as animal-friendly, in actual  practice this was 
not always the case. Many of his experiments involved suffering on the part 
of animals (Todes 2000, 2002) and countless frustrations on the part of the 
researchers, employed by Pavlov to conduct the actual research: his research 
assistants, the work  force  of  his physiology factory (Todes 2014: 147 ff.), 
known as ‘praktikanty’ (medical students  and  young  physicians  eager  to  
acquire  scientific  experience to 
advance  their  careers).6  Both  humans  and  dogs  were  regarded  as  co- 
workers (Todes 2014: 494). As Haraway (2008) argues, besides research 
assistance and animal caretakers, also the research animals themselves 
should be taken seriously as ‘workers in the lab’ (Haraway, 2008: 71, 73), 
people and dogs are workers, producing knowledge under strained conditions 
in ongoing interactions, and also the suffering is mutual. 
 
 
 
 
6 Pavlov had been nominated for the Nobel Prize in 1901, 1902, and 1903, but each 
time the committee struggled with the question to what extent the products of Pavlov’s 
laboratory were truly Pavlov’s (Zwart 2010). He designed most of the trials, presenting the 
results in books, papers and lectures, but the actual experiments were conducted by 
praktikanty. The output seemed a “compilation” of their dissertations (Todes 2002: xiii). In 
1904, the prize finally was awarded. 
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Animal suffering is often framed as a ‘necessary evil’, in  other  words, 
as an unintended by-product, causing professional malaise ($ in the lower-
right position), perhaps even turning laboratory research with  animals into 
an ‘impossible profession’ (Zwart 2016). Indeed,  in  the  course of history, 
several prominent pioneer experimentalists such as Albrecht von Haller 
(1707-1777) and Johannes Peter Müller (1801-1858) were tormented by 
feelings of guilt and despair because of the animal suffering that was  caused 
by their research, to such an extent even that  they became ‘victims of 
science’ (Ryder 1975) themselves. They either decided to leave the field 
(like Von Haller, who turned to poetry and alpine botany) or committed 
suicide, as in the case of Müller ($ in the lower-right position: moral 
suffering as unintended by-product of animal research). 
 
Pavlov addressed the moral dilemmas inherent in animal research by 
developing a unique experimental method, which he referred to as the 
‘chronic’ of ‘surgical’ method, contrasting it with the ‘acute method’ that 
was employed by the ‘champion of vivisection’ Claude Bernard (Zwart 
2008: 101). While Bernard’s dogs were severely damaged and usually died 
during or shortly after the experiment, Pavlov allowed his dogs to recover 
after being operated upon. Indeed, interest in the health and well-being of his 
experimental dogs was an inherent part of his approach. Pavlov argued that 
only normal and healthy dogs could provide a reliable model for research. He 
interfered as little as possible with the animal’s normal functioning (Wells 
1956: 18) and trained his experimental dogs to lie  calmly on the operating 
table to undergo all the manipulations of elaborate experiments, incising the 
skin and surface tissues, disclosing arteries and connecting them with 
instruments for registering blood pressure, and  similar procedures (Wells 
1956: 17). Pavlov claimed that his animals fully recovered from such 
operations, if well cared for (1955: 95). He saw his dogs as active participants 
in the experiments, thus contributing to the 
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success of his research (Todes 2000: 52; Todes 2014: 149). As Pavlov phrases 
it: 
 
Our healthy and happy animals did their laboratory work with real 
gusto; they always rushed from their cages to the laboratory and 
readily jumped on the tables where our experiments and observations 
were conducted. Believe me; I am not exaggerating one iota. Thanks to 
our surgical method in physiology we can demonstrate [the phenomena 
of digestion] without a single scream from the animal undergoing the 
experiment. 
Pavlov 1955: 132 
 
 
Pavlov devised ingenious and delicate operations to make the normal 
internal functioning of organs accessible for continuous observation, while 
impairing the organism as little as possible. In order to obtain gastric juice 
from a dog during an extended period of time, an artificial miniature 
stomach was produced, but Pavlov assures his readers that “this operation 
does not cause any serious discomfort to the animal and does not endanger 
his life” (1955: 98). Dogs were subjected to the most advanced surgical 
techniques that were also applied to humans,7 
fully return to post-operative normalcy: 
in order to allow them to 
 
I regard the promotion of our surgical technique to be a matter of 
greatest importance, because the usual method of simply vivisecting 
the animal in an acute experiment is … a major source of error, since 
the act of crude violation of the organism is accompanied by a  mass  
of inhibitory influences on the functions of the different organs. 
7 “The desire ... to spare our experimental animals as much as possible made us strictly 
observe all the precautions taken by surgeons in respect to their patients” (Pavlov 1955: 132); 
“Pavlov’s dogs were operated upon and cared for almost as if they were human patients in a 
good hospital (Todes 2000: 51). 
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Pavlov 1955: 101 
 
 
Whereas his collaborators often remain anonymous (humans without  a 
face), some of his dogs acquire a distinctive identity of  their  own, notably 
Druzhok, Pavlov’s favourite research animal  (his  ‘best  friend’). For each 
dog a notebook was compiled (Todes 2014: 494). Yet, although Pavlov took 
great pains to cultivate the image of normal and happy laboratory dogs, the 
reality was often somewhat  different  (Todes  2002: 98). Many dogs died and 
survivors would often develop chronic health problems or even fatal 
conditions, and even Druzhok became ill. 
 
In his comments, Lacan focusses on the psychic rather than on the 
physical suffering of Pavlov’s experimental dogs. After 1900, as we have 
seen, Pavlov’s focus of research shifted from physiology to psychology: 
from the animal’s metabolism to the experimental rapport between 
researchers and animals. As a consequence, the researcher-animal 
relationship became increasingly formalised. The basic component to work 
on was no longer an elementary physiological function. Rather,  a  basic need 
(e.g. hunger) became the starting point for a sequence of events. The pre-
1900 surgical cut (producing a fistula or miniature stomach) interrupted a 
physiological circuit, but post-1900 interventions invoked a  cut in the 
psychic structure of the basic need, allowing researchers to reengineer 
behaviour. With ample financial support provided by the communist 
authorities as we have seen, Pavlov designed a new type of laboratory: the 
‘towers of silence’, affording ‘maximum control over the environment of 
animals’ (Todes 2002: 349). In these facilities, the friendly interactions 
between researchers and animals gave way to a radical simplification of the 
ambiance (Pavlov 1955: 192), so that a maximum of control over the 
smallest behavioural details could be achieved (Todes 
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2000: 78). Animals no longer acted as participants in, but as amply 
documented targets of research. 
 
In the context of this shift, Pavlov noticed ‘experimental neurosis’ in 
some of his dogs as a by-product of his approach. In a famous study 
conducted by Nadeshda Shenger-Krestovnikova (one of his collaborators)  in 
1926), a conditioned alimentary reflex (an excitatory salivary response) was 
established in a dog (named Vampire) with the help of a circle of light 
projected on a screen placed in front  of  the animal (Pavlov  1955:  235). The 
circle thus became a conditioned excitatory stimulus  (CS+),  capable  of 
eliciting salivation. Subsequently, a differentiation of the circle from an 
ellipse was obtained. While the image of the circle was accompanied by 
feeding, the image of the ellipse was not. In this way, differentiation was 
achieved and the ellipse became a conditioned inhibitory stimulus (CS-), 
predicting the absence of food. Whereas the circle evoked an alimentary 
reaction, the ellipse inhibited the response through conditioning. Initially, 
however, the ellipse significantly differed from  the circle (the  proportion  of 
the axes being 2:1). Subsequently, the form of the ellipse increasingly began 
to resemble a circle. The axes of the ellipse were gradually equalized, so that 
the researchers were able to obtain ‘an increasingly delicate differentiation’ 
(ibid.: 235). When the ratio of the axes reached the value of 9:8, however, the 
dog (who previously behaved quietly  in  the stand) began to move about and 
whine, and became increasingly excited.  As discrimination became 
increasingly difficult, the dog’s behaviour became increasingly 
disorganized. And after 3 weeks had elapsed, the dog was unable to respond 
correctly to this task, even if the stimuli were  obvious circles or ellipses. 
The ability to discriminate progressively worsened and finally disappeared 
altogether, and the dog showed extreme levels of excitement when 
confronted with stimuli of this type, howling,  and struggling in his 
apparatus, running in circles, barking for no apparent 
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reason and drooling copiously. Apparently, the task had been 
‘overstressing’ (Todes 2014: 501) for the dog, and the animal now showed all 
the symptoms of an ‘acute neurosis’, due to a collision between excitatory 
and inhibitory processes (Wolpe 1996). Pavlov had apparently read (or read 
about) Breuer and Freud’s case history Anna  O  and  was struck by the 
analogy between the disorganised behaviour of the dog and the situation of 
Anna O (Windholz 1990: 49;  Gray  1979;  Todes  2014: 499). Both seemed 
caught between two contradictory impulses – excitation coming from the 
circle and inhibition induced by the ellipse. 
 
To some extent, Lacan agrees with this. The implementation of a 
signifier (as an artificial third term) disturbs the normal behavioural circuit 
and, in case of conflict, may unleash a rudimentary “neurotic response” in 
experimental dogs. According to Lacan, Pavlov’s experimental practice 
resulted in animal “neurosis” (Lacan 1966: 273, p. 460) because the  animals 
became increasingly dependent on and frustrated by the manipulations by 
the researchers ($ as  by-product  of  experimental research, lower-right 
position). At the same time, Lacan emphasises that  this neurosis (produced 
in dogs) differs from the suffering of neurotic patients (in psychoanalytic 
treatment). Whereas in animals neurotic suffering is connected to the 
experimental situation, human neurotics are haunted by language as such, by 
the labyrinthine symbolic order as such.   In Pavlov’s dogs, neurosis is a 
laboratory artefact, produced by researchers who try to force dogs to 
differentiate between circles and ellipses, but neurotic patients are tormented 
by (and hypersensitive to) the voice of conscience. They are paralysed by an 
unspeakable sense of guilt. 
 
From a behaviourist perspective, even human neurosis may be 
regarded as a misguided and dysfunctional conditioned response no doubt, an 
ill-adapted yet learned behaviour, something which behaviour therapy 
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may try to undo and reset via therapeutic techniques such as 
counterconditioning or habituation, but the goal of psychoanalysis is a 
different one. For  psychoanalysis, the question is not  how  to reengineer the 
human psyche. Psychoanalysis is not a human science, not a mental 
orthopaedics (Lacan 1953-1954/1975: 208), but  develops a  different type  of 
discourse: the discourse of the analyst. For psychoanalysis, the question is 
not why dogs salivate, but why researchers such as Pavlov develop an interest 
in saliva in the first place. What forces these praktikanty to  spend  so many 
person-hours collecting and analysing bodily fluids? From a psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, Pavlov and his co-workers become a  case  history, rather than his 
dogs. At a certain point (more or less at the time when Freud published his 
Interpretation of Dreams),  Pavlov  discerned  how a sample of saliva 
(produced in response to a sound) could open up a new arena of research. 
Somehow, this ‘rang a bell’. Pavlov’s genius was to realise that the presence 
or  absence of  saliva could serve as starting point of twentieth-century 
practices of knowledge and power. 
 
The discourse of the analyst which we have now entered, however, 
differs from university discourse and entails  another  anti-clockwise quarter 
turn of the quadruped scheme, so that the focus of attention shifts. The 
question is not how dogs can be trained to salivate, but  rather why  these 
bodily fluids, produced by certain organs (partial objects) of research 
animals, and collected in vitro via artificial openings in the  animals’  bodies, 
function as the object a, as the researchers’ object  of  desire.  In other words, 
the attention shifts from saliva as such to the dialectical interactions between 
desperate researchers (driven by a desire to know and eager to acquire 
publishable results) and certain bodily secretions  (by which they are 
fascinated or even obsessed): 
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a (secretions collected in vitro) $ (the desperate subject of 
science) 
S2 (mainstream knowledge) S1 (the political ideological 
truth) 
 
 
 
 
The researchers now take the floor as desiring, tormented subjects, 
interested rather than disinterested, and spurred into action by their object of 
desire: the dog’s saliva that (if produced in sufficient quantities) may provide 
access to a medical career. For indeed, it is by subjecting dogs to 
experimental trials that they themselves hope to pass the test and receive 
their doctorate. Their interaction is facilitated by laboratory equipment and 
concurs with what Lacan refers to as the matheme of desire ($ ◊ a), where 
$ refers to the interested researcher, ◊ to laboratory contrivances 
(experimental props) and a to something enigmatic, transient and 
inexorable, a waste product which suddenly becomes highly valuable, in  this 
case: gastric juice or drool, collected in a  tube or  dish. Around 1900, as we 
have seen, Pavlov recognised the importance of his observation that gastric 
and oral secretions were produced in response to apparently  arbitrary 
signals. Pavlov halted his physiological research  (S2 is  pushed into the 
lower-left position), because the saliva spoke out  to  him  as  it were: collect 
me, measure me! It was a disruptive experience ($), forcing him to 
drastically reconsider his research. The saliva unleased an epistemological 
rupture and created a cut in his research program, an opening which provided 
access to the logic of social engineering: the key philosopheme of the human 
sciences of the twentieth century. His techniques, his experimental know-
how, became building blocks of the ideology of social engineering 
(represented by the communist leadership): an unintended by-product of his 
research (S1 now in the lower-right position).   Thus,   saliva   eventually   
fuelled   the  program   of social 
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engineering, of the engineering of souls: the ideological credo of both 
communism and Americanism. 
 
Final comments: perverse incentives and the intrusion of the real 
Pavlov’s research facility functioned as a scaffold enabling the 
instalment of a signifier through classical conditioning. And this gave rise to 
the emergence of a rudimentary symbolic order. But such a set-up remains 
vulnerable to the intrusion of the real: the return of the repressed (i.e. the 
unconditioned, wildtype response) in the Real. Pavlov  explains how, under 
the action of ‘extraordinary, directly inhibiting stimuli’, as he phrased it, a 
chronic predominance of inhibition took place (Pavlov 1955: 238), due to a 
disruptive event which struck Pavlov’s laboratory on 23 September 1924. 
During a dramatic flooding of the river Neva, his dogs almost drowned in 
their cages and were forced to swim to the top of their cells, until they could 
be rescued with great difficulty. The carefully produced conditioned reflexes 
disappeared and although the dogs were expected to resume their work 
routine, this proved difficult in some of  them. Two dogs in particular failed 
to salivate in response to any of the established CSs (Todes 2014: 504). For a 
considerable period after rehabilitation, their responses suffered from a 
sudden surge of inhibition  and their carefully established conditioned 
reflexes seemed irretrievably deranged. Their normal environment had 
worked as a scaffold supporting their learned behaviour, revolving 
around the emergence and disappearance of signals, but now they 
experienced regression and were thrown back onto their primordial reflexes. 
Laboratories are artificial  worlds designed to keep the chaotic complexities 
of the outside world at bay, and from a Lacanian point of view, the flooding 
of the River Neva acted as an intrusion of the Real (Zwart 2017b). 
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For Lacan, this again points to the  fact that, for  research animals,  the 
set of signifiers, established in series of experiments, remains fragile, and 
may be erased in the case of trauma. Whereas human beings inevitably dwell 
in a world of symbols and language, for dogs such symbolic connections 
have to be actively established and reinforced. Experimental neurosis 
reflects the suffering of research animals as a result of manipulations on the 
part of the researchers, but human neurotics suffer from the tyranny of the 
symbolic order as such. Both animal and human neurotics experience 
dependence, thraldom even, but while experimental dogs (spending their 
lives in confinement) are completely dependent  on the actions of a  
particular experimenter, human neurotics are haunted by the linguistic and 
typographic ambiance as such, by an unspeakable and paralysing sense of 
guilt. In other words, while animals are pestered by experimental researchers, 
who expose them to projections of circles and ellipses for instance, the 
researchers themselves are spurred on by the academic voice of conscience – 
“go on, produce more knowledge, never enough!” (Lacan 1969-1970/1991: 
120-121) – and driven by a host of signifiers such as graduation 
requirements, food rations and Nobel  Prizes. In the current era, performance 
indicators, citation indexes, h-scores and funding IDs play a similar role. 
Such symbolic entities may easily evolve into perverse incentives, giving 
rise to a collective academic neurosis and perhaps even result in an obsessive 
managerial pandemic. In the human condition, such phenomena tend to 
transcend local interactions between (sloppy or committed) researchers and 
their (stern of benevolent) research managers. 
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